

The Cosmopolitan Project: Does the Internet Have a Global Public Face?

Thomas C. Hilde

It is commonly said that a principal meaning of globalization is that the world is “becoming smaller,” that “distances are collapsing,” or that “we are all interconnected.” In conjunction with economic globalization, conventional wisdom says that new technologies, increasingly widespread access to diverse kinds of information, news, and means of communication are drawing human beings “closer together.” Regardless of whether or not there is any concrete truth to these metaphors, the Internet is at the center of a constellation of factors that comprises the sentiment.

At the time of this writing, the first round of the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society has concluded in Geneva with the release of its *Draft Declaration on Principles* and its *Draft Plan of Action*. The *Draft* calls for “digital solidarity, both at the national and international levels.” While the details are too extensive to examine fully here, the *Draft* declares the participants’

... common desire and commitment to build a people-centered, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life.

One of the central goals of the Summit is the elimination of barriers of *access* to information and communications technologies (ICTs), particularly for the poor. Other important goals are the development of skills needed for such access, and the implementation of means by which the “Information Society” could include all the world’s peoples while enabling them to retain their cultural heritage. At the same time, civil society groups, concerned that the agreement mainly represents the views of governments and businesses, are exerting pressure on the Summit leaders. These groups seek not only greater assistance to poor countries, but they also insist that human rights, the preservation of local culture, knowledge, and linguistic diversity should be central elements in the development of the Internet. Just as the advantages and disad-

vantages of globalization are unequally distributed, so are the benefits of the Internet.

Combining such grand visions with an unlimited variety of local concerns makes it difficult to know where to start. This inclusive “cosmopolitan” project—complex and idealistic as it is—is nevertheless precisely the central issue regarding the Internet, civic life, and civil society in the age of “*felt* interconnectedness.” It is unclear whether diverse cultural forms of human communication can be placed at the forefront of globalization, preventing economic globalization from shaping the communicative sphere for us. Perhaps economic globalization will exert a great influence on the communicative sphere, since ICTs are both its product and facilitator.

Resolving the issues raised by the United Nations *Declaration* is not only beyond the scope of this paper, it is beyond the scope of anyone at this point. The technologies are still new and undergoing development in a variety of directions, and their social effects are as yet largely conjectural. I remain skeptical of many of the claims of both the promise and the perils of the Internet. Relying on recent examples to look for guidance, I discuss below some key features in thinking through the complex of community, cosmopolis, and ICTs. One slightly simpler question that I can begin with is this: if we grant communitarian concerns about the Internet, can we nonetheless see it as entering into the service of a cosmopolitanism sensitive to communal concerns?

Technologies

The twentieth century philosophical debates about technology involved the degree to which technologies interact *neutrally* with human values imported from beyond technological uses, or whether modern technologies have come to be *constitutive* or *determinative* of human values and relationships. This polar framework for the ontological and ethical question of technology has run its course, but the residue of tech-

no-suspicion remains, especially in much communitarian thought. Yet, the Internet is especially complex as technologies go because of its relative interactivity. It is not possible to speak of the Internet as one monolithic entity—this would be similar to speaking about “society” or “economy” without discerning classes, vocations, families, commercial enterprise, executive agencies, civic organizations, public fora, the functioning of various institutions, environment, and so on. Despite or perhaps because of its military beginnings, the shape of the Internet has been dominated largely by American-led commercial enterprise, large and small, in the service of *economic* globalization (and more specifically, the doctrine of “free trade”). Nonetheless, one can also find on the Internet various creative outposts, idiosyncratic corners, and even sources of real political influence.

The philosopher Andrew Feenberg reminds us that “the computer was not destined by some inner technologic to serve as a communications medium . . . the major networks, such as the French Teletel and the Internet were originally conceived by technocrats and engineers as instruments for the distribution of data.” But “in the course of the implantation of these networks, users appropriated them for unintended purposes and converted them into communications media.” As a technology, the Internet is unique in this

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respect: even if many users in fact live passive Internet lives, the medium itself is potentially—and often actually—interactive and, at this point, malleable enough to serve human needs that have their origins in the offline world. In the case of the Internet, the technology has been transformed into a dating service and a supplier of endless amounts of pornography), but it also addresses a steady flow of other types of concerns and needs brought to the technology from the offline world.

Consider also the recent ascendance of the blog (short for “weblog”). Blogging software enables users either to publish online diaries or to engage in interactive conversations on the Internet. Importantly, the software does not require a background in computer programming to set up or use, and has thus proliferated on the Internet—an estimated half a million blog sites at present since its introduction in the mid-1990s. The technology has become especially important in the political arena. Blogs usually have running commentary of political events and ideas with hyperlinks to

relevant texts, other similar blogs, contrary positions, and other resources. The sites often function as much better sources of information and analysis than anything found in American mass media or often even of the better American newspapers. One campaign in the 2003–2004 American presidential campaign season has made particularly effective use of blogs in mobilizing activists, in fund-raising, and in the broad-based development of ideas that sustain and expand the campaign. Members of Howard Dean’s campaign firmly believe they are engaged in participatory democracy, and to a large extent this can be seen structurally in the decentralized, functional aspects of the campaign.

Other examples suggest that the Internet is a supplemental and powerful tool in mobilizing and reinvigorating political activism with real effects beyond the world of the Internet. Much of the international human rights regime, the antiwar movement, and the environmental movement, among many others, have bolstered their development by using the Internet to augment the traditional routes of governmental and intergovernmental power and agreements. James Rosenau has suggested that the “weblike explosion of organizations has occurred in territorial space as well as cyberspace, but the opening up of the latter has served as a primary stimulus to associational proliferation in the former.” Much of the force of such civil society organizations has derived from their ability to use the Internet as an organizational tool. And, while not wielding institutionalized political power, much of their influence has come through the ability to petition, to open different types of dialogue, and to shame or embarrass those who do wield political power when such power functions contrary to the wishes or needs of people. Robert Goodin remarks that “those may

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seem paltry powers. But before dismissing them entirely, recall that that is the principal mechanism by which business gets done among states themselves . . . the swaggering of realpolitik theoreticians notwithstanding.” I would add that, apart from the internal structures of such organizations, their influence is serving to create, propagate, or disseminate the conditions (such as the human rights discourse) that may make a more diverse and inclusive Internet sphere possible in the future.

One can easily imagine the broadened base of access promoted by the UN and others as leading not only to

a proliferation of views, dialogue, and information, but also a proliferation of new software developed out of specific contextualized needs in widely varying locales. One can also easily imagine the proliferation of more fluff, more idiosyncratic sites of self-dialogue, more shopping, more ingenious ways to extract people's credit card numbers and other private information. Furthermore, as Peter Levine very helpfully discusses in his contribution to this volume, the Internet may serve to exacerbate features that are already problematic in the broader society (such as diminished equity, weakened social bonds, threats to public deliberation and to privacy). The *UN Declaration* speaks to some of these problems, some of which likely have easier solutions (privacy) than others (equity). Answering whether the Internet necessarily exacerbates these problems requires that we look at which kinds of culture have dominated the shape of the Internet to this point (and will for the foreseeable future). The negative characteristics cited are mirrored in that broader culture and existed long before the creation of the Internet. There also exists the possibility that greater global access could lead to greater diversity of uses and communication in the Internet and, even more idealistically, greater solidarity in the world beyond the Internet.

Community

A preliminary way to define community is to say that community comprises shared beliefs, values and modes of valuation, along with commitments, activities, and rites that are considered good by those who participate in them. A broad but important set of questions examines whether or not the Internet promotes community or public "space." One fear is that, just as ICTs function by disassembling messages into bits of information, transferring the bits of data at high speed, and reassembling them at the receiving end, globalization *takes apart* traditional modes of human interaction and reassembles them. Put differently, the question is whether the Internet strengthens or dissolves community, whether it brings otherwise isolated people together in meaningful ways, whether Internet groups' low thresholds of entry and exit encourage lack of commitment, whether it invigorates or atomizes public life, whether it promotes or sustains the deliberative processes integral to healthy civic life, and so on. Clearly, electronic communication and interaction are no substitute for face-to-face communication and interaction. The issue obviously turns on how one conceptualizes community from the outset. This may run the gamut from a thin version of communities as temporary, voluntary "communities of interest" to much thicker notions of community defined by an oppressive lack of choice or, for exam-

ple, as represented in the security fetish of some modern societies. At issue is not, for example, philosopher Charles Peirce's model of a truth-seeking scientific community of inquirers, because one may assuredly argue that the Internet facilitates the processes and interchanges of this kind of community as it is approximated in practice. The issue is also comparatively a matter of placed community, what William Galston's example of the Portuguese public square points up in the present volume—the same public interaction (and spaces designed for it or created through it) can be found throughout Latin America, in much of Africa, Europe, and parts of Asia, but increasingly less so in the United States unless commercialized and high security. We need to ask ourselves continually why this phenomenon is or should be the case in the United States.

A central concern appears to be what the American philosopher, Josiah Royce, nearly a century ago called the "detached individual":

the individualism of the man who belongs to no community which he loves and to which he can devote himself with all his heart, and his soul, and his mind, and his strength . . . mere detachment, mere self-will, can never be satisfied with itself, can never win its goal. What saves us on any level of human social life is union.

Insofar as the cosmopolitan is a "citizen of the world" in the sense of being attached to no place and no one, the detached individual just *is* the cosmopolitan.

The evidence, anecdotal as it largely is at this point in the Internet's history, seems to lead toward the negative answer to the above set of questions. Among the reasons given for the conjecture that the Internet weakens or fragments community and public life are that participants are isolated, Internet groups are allowed easy exit and exhibit little commitment, and one typically sees only temporary social ties and understandings.

On the other hand, an important recent study of a "wired community" near Toronto by two MIT and University of Toronto researchers, Keith Hampton and Barry Wellman, suggests that Internet users may actually be *more* inclined to human neighborhood interaction outside of time spent in front of the computer compared to those who are less Internet-active. While, again, any Internet study should be taken with some skepticism, this study examined not only "life online," but the broader range of Internet users' personal and technologically mediated human contacts. This seems a crucial issue in any such study—whether Internet use comes to be a substitute for other offline activities and ideas or whether it augments offline activities and ideas. The authors argue that

Online social ties are not a distinct social system, separate and cut off from existing foci of activity and existing social net-

work members. Rather, the Internet affects community as one form of communication among many, whose use and implications are intertwined.

They further argue that the Internet has a number of advantages over other forms of communication, including "its ability to facilitate neighborhood based interactions, specifically the asynchronous, broadcast ability of e-mail." The strong implication here—that the Internet may strengthen local community ties more generally—is difficult to accept, given the local nature of the research. But one may nevertheless at least conclude the weak implication from the study that impediments to local community are more a function of other features of modern life than they are of online life.

On communitarian grounds, one can find weaknesses to the view that the Internet serves to strengthen community in a substantive way. One can also be concerned about what this means for our

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human future given the increasingly pervasive role of the Internet in various facets of human lives. This communitarian type of critique is at least agnostic regarding the Internet when not in advocacy of its nonuse. But one wonders what to do with the stronger form of this critique. The Internet and ICTs have an air of inevitability about them. Is there a communitarian option? It is not clear what this would be, beyond either overly aggressive political action or individuals or tight-knit groups opting out. Only the opt-out option is feasible and, indeed, desirable for some. It appears that what remain are a communitarian agnosticism and a cautionary note well-taken regarding ICT development and implementation and regarding offline life. But the Hampton and Wellman study, if representative, seems to show that the problem has been framed in a misleading way. The study confirms that the problems of dissolution for community predate the existence of the Internet and may be found in other activities of contemporary post-industrial life. It suggests at the very least that the Internet does not necessarily accelerate or exacerbate these problems.

Global Cosmopolitanism

Detachment, however, is equally problematic at the level of communities and intercommunal relationships. The preeminent philosopher of democratic community, John Dewey, insisted that the quality of the

community depended not only on "many interests consciously communicated and shared," but also on "varied and free points of contact with other modes of association." The former condition requires novelty and equity, among other imperatives. The latter condition, the one I am most concerned with here, requires interaction with other groups. As Dewey wrote in a discussion of democratic community,

It is a commonplace that an alert and expanding mental life depends upon an enlarging range of contact with the physical environment. But the principle applies even more significantly to the field where we are apt to ignore it—the social sphere.

For his part, the religious communitarian and internationalist Royce maintained the importance of encouraging the young to go out of the community (or "province") and learn from others in order to return with "what they thus acquire for the furtherance of the life of their own community." Many "points of contact" is empty unless this entails the existence of various options as well as openness to transformation on the part of individuals and groups. It resists the vision of an archipelago of isolated communities. Minimally, this notion of communities requires curiosity as well as practical outlets for the satisfaction of curiosity.

But we can go farther. Full public life is increasingly global in cause and consequence. To use an apt cliché: the local is global. The selfhood of individuals is increasingly defined in terms beyond tradition, church, family, vocation, and neighborhood, though these all remain in some form. Communities have always had boundaries permeable to ideas and "outsiders"; they are much more so in the "global" age. And some of the most pressing problems individuals,

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communities, and nations face are transnational in nature (e.g., environmental problems and risks, disease, terrorism and other aggression, human rights). Mass media and ICTs impact the lives of a growing number of people, if not most, worldwide. Migration and global travel—not new phenomena—grow through necessity and desire. Human experience is a history of stasis and security, but it is also a history of travel and insecurity. When it is not of the Club Med variety, replicating conditions or ideals of comfort from home, travel may provoke and transform. We return at least slightly and maybe even radically different people or perhaps do not return at all. On the other hand, migration entails a complex overlapping

and conciliation of sometimes very different, conflicting worlds of value.

These observations do not necessarily constitute a kind of cultural cosmopolitanism. They are not merely the fantasies of detached "postmodern bourgeois liberals," as often derided. They are real facets of life and represent both possibilities for and foreclosures of diverse cultural ties. Consider, for example, Helena Norberg-Hodge's studies of the remote region of Ladakh in the Indian Himalayas and Tibetan Plateau. She describes a former socially and environmentally sustainable, and peaceful, traditional culture reshaped during the past thirty years by the introduction of tourism, Western mass media, and Western-style education based in "universal knowledge." Norberg-Hodge maintains that this restructuring of Ladakhi society has led not only to an uprooting of ideas and practices from their context, but to a society of shame in which younger generations compare themselves negatively to their televised Western counterparts and find themselves to be poor and uneducated. The effects have been ruinous for Ladakhi culture—from an increase in acquisitiveness over cooperation, to unsustainable consumption practices, to an increase in ethnic violence as different groups compete for limited resources. Norberg-Hodge ascribes these changes to the broader notion of "globalization." Perhaps one of the most tragic aspects of such examples is that just as a group is accepting and adapting to a way of life imported from elsewhere, that way of life is undergoing its own intense criticism of itself as unsustainable. The Ladakh example (and an endless number could be cited) points up the viruslike nature of a *particular kind* of Western culture and asymmetrical cultural contact.

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Such cases provide an admonition, for both the sake of us and others, against uncritically embracing the free-flow of cultural artifacts. It suggests responsibilities pulling in a number of directions, as the consequences of certain lifestyles impede upon those of others.

Considerations such as those outlined above are among the global cultural issues that have partially driven a resurgence in both communitarian and cosmopolitan thought, a parting of the ways in relation to global issues faced by everyone. Cosmopolitans "hold to a vision that accepts, even celebrates, the diversity of social and political systems in the world, taking pleasure in the existence and the products of peoples

The New Progressive Era: Toward a Fair and Deliberative Democracy

Peter Levine

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Liberal Pluralism

The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice

William A. Galston

Isaiah Berlin first advanced the moral theory of value pluralism in the 1950s and it subsequently was developed by a number of distinguished scholars, including Galston. In *Liberal Pluralism*, Galston defends a version of value pluralism for political theory and practice. Against the contentions of John Gray and others, Galston argues that value pluralism undergirds a kind of liberal politics that gives great weight to the ability of individuals and groups to live their lives in accordance with their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning and purpose to life. This account of liberal pluralism is shown to have important implications for political deliberation and decision-making, for the design of public institutions, and for the division of legitimate authority among government, religious institutions, civil society, parents and families, and individuals.

Liberal pluralism leads to a vision of a good society in which political institutions are active in a limited sphere and in which, within broad limits, families and civil associations may organize and conduct themselves in ways that are not congruent with the principles that govern the public sphere.

William A. Galston is a distinguished political philosopher whose work is informed by the experience of having served from 1993-1995 as President Clinton's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy. He is Saul I. Stern Professor of Civic Engagement at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland; Director at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy; and Director of the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). He is the author of numerous articles and several books, including *Liberal Purposes* (Cambridge, 1991), which won the Spitz Prize. He is also a Senior Advisor to the Democratic Leadership Council and the Progressive Policy Institute.

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and places other than our homes... display concern for our fellow humans without demanding of them that they be or become like ourselves." In theoretical terms, moral and political cosmopolitanism are hotly debated in philosophy and political thought. Although there exists a diverse and growing range of views within each of these categories, moral cosmopolitanism generally constitutes sets of arguments for obligations to aid human beings as human beings apart from the boundaries of region or nation. It includes foreigners or strangers as candidates for moral consideration and obligation rather than only those in more intimate relations of community. Political cosmopolitanism generally insists on the view that political institutions should map onto and reflect these moral duties, especially in response to problems that cross borders or as the counterpart to economic globalization. Such institutions could range from "world government" to interactively layered local, regional, and global institutions.

In contrast to this approach, I want to propose that what is needed is something along the lines of an *epistemic cosmopolitanism* that does some work toward reconciling the disjunctive communitarian and cosmopolitan responses to globalization (and the role of ICTs). Like communitarian views, epistemic cosmopolitanism accepts and defends the "thickness" of values and beliefs embedded in particular contexts. Any inquiry in which humans engage is attached to particular contexts of belief, history, and environ-

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ment. There is no discernible moral or political viewpoint beyond such contexts that could legitimately represent all concerns, beliefs, and values of all communities. But, as a form of cosmopolitanism, epistemic cosmopolitanism treats those contexts empirically as increasingly global. It takes tradition seriously. It also takes seriously the possibilities of curiosity and transformation by indicating that our individual and communal knowing, valuing, and believing draws upon and contributes to an expanded and globalizing range of ideas, beliefs, practices, events, and traditions. It does so in such a way that problems we individually and collectively face may, at times, be tackled best through changing the conceptions of community or individual with which we start. In other words, it takes as its starting point the basic idea that communities and individuals

are not fixed but evolving entities. Better or worse forms of both are a function of whether those forms serve towards resolving real, practical problems. Epistemic cosmopolitanism expresses the fallibility and possible revision of the positions brought to the table in resolving practical problems. It celebrates not the detached "citizen of the world" belonging to no place and no one, but contextualized peoples and communities whose "memberships" increasingly stretch beyond traditional notions of membership. The idea is that this then entails a broader variety of practical means and ends for thinking through problems we face collectively. Even if participants in collective action are not all led to one overarching principled view of the way things should be, they are at least aware of the practical constraints and possibilities of their views.

If the public is shaped less as a congealing of collective identities for the sake of shoring up identity, but more as a collective response to the problems human beings face, then we should be able to speak of the public itself as globalizing. The question then involves the shape in which globalized society takes. This is precisely the difficulty to which the United Nations *Declaration* responds.

Conclusion

We ought not to be overly sanguine about the prospects of the Internet, especially since its present form and content are still largely based on a particular culture's activities posing as universal culture. But, I have been suggesting, this need not necessarily be the case, and the technologies involved as well as the informational and communicative content are rapidly changing as more people in more places are online. Clearly, issues of equity and a host of other problems regarding the Internet still require attention and resolution. It is not clear, however, that this resolution can be found without resolving them first in our broader societies and between societies. The tendency to substitute online detachment for affective, embodied

allow other avenues of communication to shut down, such as public space. But there seems to me no reason to see the Internet as inherently fated to shut down dialogue and deliberation, and to reinforce *bad* habits of community. Rather, I find persuasive indications that creative combinations of communal life online and communal life offline are only as good as the variety of features of local, national, and global society allow.

Thomas C. Hilde
Visiting Assistant Professor
School of Public Affairs
University of Maryland
thilde@umd.edu

Sources: United Nations, *Draft Declaration of Principles*. World Summit on the Information Society (December 9, 2003) Document WSIS/PC-3/DT/6(Rev 3)-E; for a comprehensive review of twentieth-century philosophical debates about the degree to which technologies interact with human values, see Carl Mitcham, *Thinking Through Technology* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994); Andrew Feenberg, *Questioning Technology* (London: Routledge, 1999). For a discussion of how the Howard Dean campaign has made effective use of blogs, see Helen Shapiro, "The Dean Connection," *New York Times Magazine* (December 7, 2003); James Rosenau, *Distant Proximities* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003); Robert Goodin, "Globalizing Justice," in *Taming Globalization*, edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). For discussions of whether the Internet strengthens or dissolves community, see Uslaner, Galston, and Levine's articles in this present volume. For a discussion of notions of community, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Charles S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," originally published in 1868, and found in *The Essential Peirce*, edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992). The importance of certain forms of physical space for a rich public life cannot be underestimated. The American tendency to rely on the market for even the physical ordering of lived environments means that possibilities for public life in physical space are sometimes hit upon only accidentally. For broader discussions of this tension regarding public space, see Jane Jacobs' classic *The Death and Life of American Cities* (New York: Vintage, 1961), *Variations on a Theme Park* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), edited by Michael Sorkin, and James Howard Kunstler, *The City in Mind* (New York: Free Press, 2003). Josiah Royce, "The Hope of the Great Community," originally published in 1916, and found in *The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce, Volume 2*, edited by John J. McDermott (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969); Keith Hampton and Barry Wellman, "Neighboring in Netville: How the Internet Supports Community and Social Capital in a Wired Suburb," in *City and Community* (vols. 2&3, Fall 2003); see also www.chass.utoronto.ca/~wellman/publications/index.htm. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Free Press, 1916); Josiah Royce, "Provincialism," which originally appeared in 1908, in volume 2, cited above; for further discus-

The tendency to substitute online detachment for affective, embodied interaction with other human beings or "communities" of like-minded individuals . . . will win out only to the extent that societies allow other avenues of communication to shut down. . . .

interaction with other human beings or intensified "communities" of like-minded individuals sharing their fears and fantasies in isolated and antagonistic groups will win out only to the extent that societies

sion, also see Thomas C. Hilde, "Provincialism, Displacement, and Royce's Idea of Community," in *The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism*, edited by Paul B. Thompson and Thomas C. Hilde (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 2000). The expression "postmodern bourgeois liberalism" is Richard Rorty's; see his article of the same term, in his work *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991). Helena Norberg-Hodge, "The Pressure to Modernize and Globalize," in *The Case Against the Global Economy*, edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996); see also her earlier book, *Ancient Futures: Learning from Ladakh* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991). The contention that cosmopolitans accept diversity without demanding that others themselves become cosmopolitans is made by K. Anthony Appiah, "Citizens of the World," in *Globalizing Rights*, edited by Matthew J. Gibney (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003). A more detailed discussion of these views, as well as the array

of anti-cosmopolitan arguments, is beyond the scope of this essay. For an interesting overview of some of the historical roots of cosmopolitanism, see Thomas J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ. Press, 1977). Among the numerous contemporary examples of cosmopolitan works, see Martha Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002); Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000); Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2002). For a nuanced critique of cosmopolitanism, see the essays by Will Kymlicka in his *Politics in the Vernacular* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001).


Genetic Prospects: Essays on Biotechnology, Ethics, and Public Policy (Volume II of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy Studies series)

While the collapse of the Soviet Union has diminished the force of George Orwell's *1984*, the other great dystopian tract of the twentieth century, Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, is timelier than ever. The ongoing process of genetic science may well revolutionize medicine and human reproduction, and it may end by giving us the ability to transform the human species itself. This new power has raised hopes that we will solve a range of genetically based problems that afflict us. It has also evoked fears that we are on the verge of a "post human" future in which precious but necessary norms regulating individual and social life will be set aside. Will we have the moral and political wisdom to avoid the pitfalls in using new biotechnologies?

Genetic Prospects considers the resources from which the needed norms and maxims might be drawn, scrutinizing carefully the contributions of common sense, religion, and moral sentiment. Taken together, the essays in this volume apply philosophical analysis to address three kinds of questions: What are the implications of genetic science for our understanding of nature? What might it influence in our conception of human nature? What challenges does genetic science poses for specific issues of private conduct or public policy?

Contributors: Harold W. Baillie, William A. Galston, Sara Goering, Deborah Hellman, Mark Sagoff, Paul B. Thompson, Robert Wachbroit, David T. Wasserman, and Richard M. Zaner

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
WAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

What are the limits of justified retaliation against aggression? What actions are morally permissible in preventing future aggression? Against whom may retaliation be aimed? These questions have long been part of the debate over the ethics of warfare. They all took on new meaning after terrorists hijacked four US airliners on September 11, 2001.

War after September 11 considers the just aims and legitimate limits of the United States' response to the terrorist attacks. Six essayists from the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland pair off to discuss ethical questions such as, What are the moral challenges posed by terrorism? Can modern terrorism be addressed within the existing paradigms of just war and international law? Should the U.S. respond militarily or by some other means? Taken together, the essays in this volume ask the fundamental question: How should the United States use its power to combat terrorism?

Contributors: Benjamin R. Barber, Lloyd J. Dumas, Robert K. Fullinwider, William A. Galston, Paul W. Kahn, Judith Lichtenberg, David Luban; Verna V. Gehring, editor.

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