

codifying into statute and regulation what has been the reality in practice all along—the exclusion of child custody, adoption, and fostering by gay couples. These policies systematically block the creation of gay familial units and indirectly contribute to the decay of gay relations by appealing so directly to an alleged wickedness of gays, as corruptors, and an alleged worthlessness of gays, as role models.

Compassion would suggest and compensatory justice should require that the day-to-day care of the

final-stage AIDS patient be provided in lieu of the care he would have likely had but for society's blocking his creation of his own family.

—Richard D. Mohr

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Income and Development

The term "development" and terms such as "less developed," "undeveloped," and "underdeveloped" are universally used in talking and thinking about change in the Third World. There are journals of development economics, textbooks on the process of development, organizations devoted to development. It is therefore striking that for all that has been written about development and how to achieve it, relatively little attention has been given to the basic question: What is development?

The notion of development suggests something of a natural process that an entity goes through. Thus we might speak of the development of an acorn, or of a child, but not the development of a stone or of a bookshelf. Moreover, the process envisaged is not a matter merely of change, but involves the working out of the *potential* of the entity. When an acorn develops into an oak tree, the change that takes place is coming from within; outside elements serve only as an environment within which the oak can develop into itself and in so doing fulfill its potential. The notion of development, then, carries within it the complementary notions of actualization, growth, maturity, fullness of being.

Given these particular features of the concept of development, it is striking that we speak of nations, economies, and societies as developed and undeveloped. Just what we mean by "potential," "maturity," or "fullness of being" when discussing economies and societies is elusive. Thus, economists, planners, and decision-makers typically turn to some notion that can be more easily articulated and more readily used as a guide to policy choices. The notion of economic growth is appealing in this way. An economy has grown if and only if the pile of goods and services produced by that economy (the total or per capita output) in a given time period is larger than the pile it produced in the previous time period.

But we cannot equate development with growth. Simply growing larger carries with it no notion of maturity. In principle, a mature elephant could get larger

and larger, yet we would not say that the giant elephant was more advanced or had more fully realized its potential than had normal-sized elephants. Similarly, economic growth does not necessarily imply that the society is becoming more developed, or even that the economy is becoming more developed.

Economic *development*—as an ideal Third World countries are supposed to be striving toward—must depend on something broader. An economy is more developed, not if it produces an ever-larger pile of goods and services, but if it more fully contributes to the development of the society as a whole. And a society is developed insofar as it makes possible the development of the human beings within it. It is the notion of human development that is our central concept.

Income versus Basic Needs

How is one to link an appraisal of societies to judgments about the kind of human beings they give rise to? Almost all modern thought about development is egalitarian in the sense that there is concern with the *breadth* of human development rather than the *depth*. It does not measure development by the heights of human greatness achieved in a given society, but by the general level of human well-being. But within a general egalitarian framework, the distinction is made between three broad approaches to economic development that go under the rubrics: "trickle down," "equitable growth," and "basic needs." These three views adopt different understandings of what counts as development progress, of what it is for an economy or a society to *be* developed. They also differ with respect to *how* to achieve development—but that is not our immediate issue.

For both the equitable-growth and trickle-down conceptions the central good to be attained is higher income. Moreover, while it is clear that equitable-development advocates care about the distribution of income, the trickle-down conception is also concerned

with distribution. The point of arguing that higher levels of overall GNP *will* trickle down through the society is to attempt to show that aggregate economic growth benefits *everyone*.

The two views have a fundamental difference with respect to the goals of development, however. The claim that economic benefits trickle down contains an implicit suggestion that so long as everyone, or almost everyone, ends up benefiting, all is well. The question of *how much* trickles down to *how many* is generally not raised by trickle-down advocates. It is sufficient that most people have higher incomes, whether or not there may have been some broad increase in inequality.

On the equitable-growth orientation, an increase in most people's—or even everyone's—income does not automatically constitute progress. Whether or not progress has occurred is a matter of the balance between the gains in income and the loss of equality. If there is a broad increase in inequality of income then the growth in income for the poorer classes would have to be significant; not any increase is adequate.

Now let us compare these income-based orientations to the basic-needs approach. The basic-needs theorist makes two observations. First, having more income is not a good in itself; what is important is satisfying basic needs. And second, we cannot assume that needs are better satisfied at higher income levels. A great deal depends on the composition of output, on the quantities and prices of the goods and services that are available for purchase with private income, and on the extent and quality of a wide variety of goods and services that are typically provided by the government (health services, education, water quality).

Both the trickle-down orientation and the equitable-growth orientation are prepared to accept income and its distribution as adequate indicators of developmental progress. They argue that income allows people to satisfy their preferences, and that there is no valid basis for giving priority to some other pattern of consumption than that actually chosen by the individual (and the public sector to which he is subject). The basic-needs orientation is unwilling to take income as an index of developmental progress. It insists on looking at the extent to which basic needs have actually been met, at the extent to which problems such as hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, infant mortality, and disease have actually been overcome.

Earlier I maintained that a concept of societal development rests on something more fundamental, on a notion of human development. What basis is there for going from the claim that people have a higher level of income or basic-needs satisfaction to the claim that they have achieved a higher level of development?

Orientations that view income as ultimately significant regardless of the extent to which it results in need satisfaction will be hard pressed to establish the connection. But there is a logical link between the notion of needs and the notion of development. To see this, consider how it is that we distinguish between something that someone *needs* and something he *wants*. Peo-

ple want all sorts of things; there are only a limited set of things that they need. Moreover, they need these things whether or not they want them. Basic needs are no mystery, consisting essentially of food, shelter, clothing, health care, and education. To call something a basic need is to say that in its absence the most basic physical and intellectual development of the individual will be blocked. Thus, a basic-needs conception of development understands by developmental progress the elimination of conditions of mass deprivation that prevent the fuller development of the individual. Income approaches to development can make this connection only insofar as income is taken to be a reliable indicator of basic-needs satisfaction, and this, of course, is a highly questionable assumption.

The Case Against Getting Richer

Once basic needs have been taken care of, however, what is the relationship between human development and increasing wealth? One school of thought is that beyond a certain point the relationship is antithetical: accumulation leads to greater taste for accumulation, appetite merely begets further appetite, and in the end human development suffers as we become further engaged in the processes of accumulation and consumption. Few of us in the rich societies have not, at least for some brief moment, paused to wonder if in fact our involvement with "things" hadn't gone too far, hadn't in some ways taken us away from some undefined pursuit that is more important.

The case that can be made for economic progress well beyond the level of pure subsistence does not have to do with the value of things, but with the value of time. The greater value of higher levels of productivity is not that they make possible higher levels of consumption, but that they make possible lower levels of labor. The impoverished are forced to spend an enormous amount of time in activities that are ultimately destructive of their human potential. What the rich have, at least

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If someone spends a major part of his waking hours engaged in activity that fails to serve as a vehicle for personal expression, does not embody his values, does not provide for him either the esteem of others or his self-esteem, and is not a vehicle for his personal growth, then his participation in economic life is

destructive of his development, except insofar as it provides him with the resources and leisure time to pursue that development in other spheres of life.

Put in different terms, there are two possible notions of a developed economy. In both, a developed economy is one that contributes to the development of the human beings who participate in it. The distinction is between extrinsic and intrinsic impacts on human development. The primary extrinsic impact on human development is the provision of income and financial security. The intrinsic impacts have to do with the wide range of direct effects economic activity has on psychological, intellectual, and moral development.

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Human health is precarious—activity that is not intrinsically healthful cannot be undertaken for long before it harms the individual. A developed economy which rests primarily on the extrinsic contribution of economic activity is possible only if work time is reduced to a relatively minor portion of a person's time. An extrinsically developed economy would provide the economic resources and financial security that allow individuals to pursue that which is worthwhile in itself with only, say, ten hours of work a week. The wealthiest economies today have this potential. In fact, however, these economies operate within a broader social life that does not permit individuals to avail themselves of this potential. The central dynamic is that at the income and consumption levels that would correspond to ten hours of work a week, the individual can rarely achieve self-esteem or the esteem of others. A person who works ten hours a week and lives on the average income that ten hours provides would be a misfit in our society. Periodically certain subcultures attempt to free themselves from material attachments—to develop an alternative shared understanding of the bases of personal and social esteem. But without cultural change that redefines the meaning of income and consumption, only isolated individuals can take advantage of the potential for extrinsic economic development that wealthy societies provide.

The other notion of a developed economy is one that provides for human development intrinsically, through forms of work and organization that are inherently enriching and thus promote rather than stunt human development. On a mass basis no such forms have yet emerged. Indeed, many have argued that we have moved toward forms of economic life that are intrinsically destructive of human development.

In general, over the last fifty years, Americans have

taken most of the increase in labor productivity in the form of higher income rather than in the form of less labor time or more self-developing forms of labor. *Our economic life is neither extrinsically nor intrinsically developed.* And just as we have been undone by the rising level of income and consumption all around us, which has changed the social meaning of lower levels of income, so today the world is being enmeshed in our consumption styles. There is no Third World country today in which the life style of the rich countries is not known, and in which the tastes of the poor are not shifting toward appetites for what they do not have and will never attain. The implications of this are horrifying. The following table shows the number of years it will take various developing nations, at current growth rates, to catch up to the income levels of the rich countries.

The GNP Race

Country	\$ GNP per Capita 1983*	Annual Growth Rate GNP/Capita 1965-83*	Number of Years Until Gap Closes if 1965-83 rates continue
Industrial Market Economies	11,060	2.5	
Korea, Rep. of	2,010	6.7	42
Brazil	1,880	5.0	73
Syria	1,760	4.9	79
Yemen Arab Rep.	550	5.7	98
Ecuador	1,420	4.6	101
Indonesia	560	5.0	124
Egypt	200	4.2	167
China	300	4.4	196
Philippines	760	2.9	687.5
Morocco	760	2.9	687
Sri Lanka	330	2.9	902
Cameroon	820	2.7	1334.7
Costa Rica	1,020	2.1	Never
Kenya	340	2.3	Never
India	260	1.5	Never
46 other developing countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Zaire, Burma, Tanzania, Haiti, Pakistan, Bolivia, Peru)			Never

*Source: The World Bank, World Development Report, 1985 gap calculations by author.

What we need is an egalitarian concept of development that will function to advance the genuine development of the poorer nations. The notion of equitable growth will not do this. Even at rapid rates of equitable growth, the vast mass of mankind will be engaged indefinitely in pursuit of the income levels of the rich countries. We need a type of development that will allow the masses of mankind quickly to overcome the most debilitating aspects of their poverty and then to avoid transforming themselves into a mere means for the advancement of their incomes. In short, we need a notion of development that will permit the overcoming of the worst poverty-induced obstacles to human development and at the same time will articu-

late what it is to have a developed society and to be a developed human being at low levels of income. I have argued that a basic-needs conception of development is a central part of this notion. Basic needs can be satisfied at relatively low levels of income, but only if a society deliberately seeks a development path that will do so.

It may be objected that this is all very nice for those in rich countries to espouse because it leaves them at the top and tells the rest of mankind to settle for less. This objection misses the point. The prescription of low

incomes and high leisure levels is not offered merely to the poor. It also represents the direction that we in the rich countries should go in, if we are to become not just rich, but truly and fully developed.

—Jerome Segal

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The Biotechnology Controversy

Biotechnology, according to most commentators, promises to revolutionize industry and everyday life. The British journal *The Economist* predicts that "biology will launch an industry as characteristic of the twenty-first century as those based on physics and chemistry have been of the twentieth century." Statements such as this express the sense of exhilaration and apprehension which, over the past few years, has produced screaming headlines, Promethean prospects, stock-market fever, and all sorts of intellectual inflation. On even the most conservative view, however, new developments in biotechnology are likely to affect the way we think about the living world and the way we understand our relationship to it.

Nature and Society

Anthropologists, in describing the tribes they study, frequently emphasize the relation between the social structure of the tribe and its cosmology or view of nature. Among these anthropologists, Mary Douglas most prominently has argued that "the moral commitment of a community to a set of institutions" is secured by its view of what is natural and what goes contrary to nature, in other words, "how the environment will react." The conception of nature implicit in social arrangements and institutions, according to Douglas, "exists as a structure of meaningful distinctions." The social order begins to come apart, she adds, when "separate voices claim to know about different environmental constraints" and different visions of nature contend for credibility.

It is commonplace to point out that the great social and cultural revolutions in society have been accompanied by—and are to an extent caused by—major changes in assumptions about nature and the place of humanity in it. The cosmology of pretechnological societies, for example, found in nature all sorts of omens and meanings by which people could explain natural events to themselves (e.g., as divine rewards

and punishments) in order to give significance and importance to their own actions. The distinctions tribal societies drew between the pure and the polluted, the safe and dangerous, often served to legitimate power relationships and the rules and conventions which governed behavior in those societies.

After Galileo and Newton, a conception of the living world became dominant which reflected the order scientists had found in the physical world. The eighteenth century presented nature as a masterpiece of organic forms set together in a perfect design by a benign creator, a Great Chain of Being. A hierarchical and conventional order in society—where each group understood its station and its duties—reflected this idea of an immutable and static order in nature.

After Darwin, the nineteenth century experienced a reversal in its conception of the way the living world is organized. In the early days of evolutionary theory, Social Darwinists were quick to extend the ideas of competition, struggle, adaptation, fitness, and change from plant and animal communities to human societies, thus making "natural" the "great transformation" of land and labor into fungible, marketable commodities. It was only after a great deal of humane reconsideration—a battle still going on today in the arguments over sociobiology—that culture and nature were sufficiently distinguished to overcome some of the excesses of the Social Darwinist and eugenics movements.

By the 1960s, evolutionary theory had become established and with it a historical appreciation of man's origin and place in nature. In the United States, the environmental movement emphasized the importance of preserving the products of natural history, particularly biological communities, the "integrity" of which, so they argued, supported human survival. Environmental legislation enacted during the 1960s and 1970s called upon the nation to preserve the "health" of ecosystems, the "integrity" of the nation's waters, and the "balance" of natural populations. These laws