Abstract
The latest and arguably most promising philosophical account of welfare is Daniel Haybrons (2008) self-fulfillment account. Roughly, according to Haybron, welfare consists of three aspects: (1) emotional flourishing, (2) success in identity-related projects, and (3) the fulfillment of the individuals sub-personal nature. In order to point out the implications of the self-fulfillment account of welfare for (welfarist) moral theory and welfare-directed policy-making, one needs to understand what this account entails, and whom it applies to. The self-fulfillment account of welfare has never been tested with regard to the virtue of generality, which is one of the four cardinal virtues for theories of welfare that Sumner (1996, 14) famously introduced. The virtue of generality holds that a theory of welfare should be applicable to all beings with welfare. This paper aims at filling this gap. We first focus on self-fulfillment and suggest an interpretation of Haybrons account according to which the self-fulfillment of an individual consists in the fulfillment of the aspects of the self that are applicable to that particular individual. This makes Haybrons account of welfare applicable to all sentient beings. Then we will focus on sub-personal nature-fulfillment and argue that the same interpretation leads to the conclusion that Haybrons account of welfare recognizes even non-sentient beings as welfare subjects. We suggest a way of avoiding this letter conclusion. We conclude that in any case Haybrons account of welfare, on our interpretation, has the virtue of generality.
How to Cite:
Visak, T. & Balcombe, J.,
(2013) “The Applicability of the Self-fulfillment Account of Welfare to Nonhuman Animals, Babies, and Mentally Disabled Humans”,
Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 31(2),
27–34.
doi: https://doi.org/10.13021/G8pppq.312013.212