Abstract
Amartya Sens capability perspective does not endorse any particular substantive view of the good life, but is compatible with a variety of approaches to evaluation. This paper explains some of the relevant theoretical debates, and Sens desire to leave his approach open to different evaluative approaches in application. This openness has led some to argue that he does not provide a view of well-being which is suitable for practical purposes. I argue that Sens perspective makes some significant theoretical commitments. As a result, it illuminates various public policy issues even if it is not filled out with a single explicit list (of valuable functionings or capabilities) of the sort Martha Nussbaum endorses. In the context of policy, the implications of Sens views diverge from Richard Layards utilitarian proposals. They can also diverge from those of Nussbaums version of the approach.
How to Cite:
Qizilbash, M.,
(2013) “On Capability and the Good Life: Theoretical Debates and their Practical Implications”,
Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 31(2),
35–42.
doi: https://doi.org/10.13021/G8pppq.312013.133